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Proponents of RPM argue that RPM helps to sustain a high level of service at the point of sale and that such 
a high level is efficient. This paper provides a simple model which leads to the following conclusions: 1) RPM 
may increase or decrease the level of service. 2) Whether the service level is more efficient under RPM does 
not depend on the fact that service increases due to RPM. It may be lower under RPM and more efficient. 
3) Whether the service level is more efficient depends on the characteristics of the heterogeneous consumers. 
A feature of the model which deviates from those found in the literature is the introduction of a class of 
consumers who do not search but decide on a purchase spontaneously.  
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Does the Service Argument Justify Resale 
Price Maintenance? 
The issue of resale price maintenance (RPM) has a long history. In the 
English-speaking world one attributes its beginning to the pricing of Alfred 
Marshall’s Principles of Economics (Breit (1991)). However, the evidence for 
RPM reaches back for a considerably longer time (Picot (1991)). But it is not 
merely a greeting from the distant past. Every once in while it becomes a hot 
topic. In March 2005 the Swiss Competition Commission (WeKo) prohibited 
a RPM arrangement of the Swiss book trade (WeKo (2005)). Germany had 
recently a debate on resale price maintenance in the book trade which led to 
the remarkable situation that resale price maintenance is mandatory by law in 
this sector (since 2002), while it is forbidden per se for all other sectors. 
These decisions are obviously in considerable conflict to each other. Of 
course, the issue of RPM is not restricted to the book trade. The literature has 
pointed to a vast array of industries where RPM takes the form of price 
floors, price ceilings or stipulated prices (e.g. Winter (1993), Chen (1999)). 
The U.S. policy towards RPM and more generally towards vertical restraints 
is reported to have shifted over time and to be not very consistent (Comanor 
and Rey (1997)). 
Theoretically, this could reflect the ambivalent evaluation of RPM by the 
profession, where a positive attitude on the grounds of efficiency within a 
supply chain is counterbalanced by concerns about competition impeding 
effects. Quite a number of explanations have been provided for the existence 
of RPM. This specific form of a vertical restraint is said to overcome the 
double marginalization problem (e.g. Tirole (1988), to aid collusion (e.g. 
Jullien and Rey (2000)), to enhance the service level of retailers (e.g. Telser 
(1960), Winter (1993)), to provide incentives to retailers to hold sufficient 
inventories (Deneckere et al. (1996)), to overcome a commitment problem 
(e.g. Hart and Tirole (1990)), to suppress price discrimination by retailers 
(Chen (1999)), to name a few. Some of these explanations speak for positive 
efficiency effects of RPM other for negative effects. Excellent recent surveys 
can be found e.g. in Motta (2004) or in Rey and Vergé (2005). 
This paper focuses exclusively on the suggested justification of RPM by 
the service argument. Unconstrained price competition is said to lead to an 
inadequate supply of service. The free rider argument which posits that a Resale Price Maintenance  2
 
customer may ask for product information (service) in one shop and than buy 
at a different shop which does not provide such information and can therefore 
offer the product at a cheaper price is one – albeit an extreme - variant of the 
efficiency argument. Indeed, in its extreme form this argument is not 
convincing in the book trade nor is it convincing in other sectors, where the 
price of a commodity is low relative to search costs (Winter (1993)). 
However, as Mathewson and Winter (1998) have stressed, the service 
argument is more general. Unconstrained price competition can erode the 
financial capability to provide high quality service. If service is valuable to 
consumers they might get hurt by abolishing RPM. Hence, there is scope for 
an efficiency rationale for RPM based on the service argument. Nevertheless 
it has long been acknowledged that RPM may induce such a high level of 
service that corresponding costs are not worth the potentially increased utility 
of consumers. 
Much of the literature relevant to this topic has stressed the situation where 
firms use RPM to induce higher prices and higher service. Comanor (1985) 
provides an analysis showing that such increases in price and service may be 
in the interest of a manufacturer but may decrease social surplus. He also 
provides a case where social surplus is increased. He argues that social 
surplus increases if the increased level of service shifts the (linear) demand 
curve in a parallel manner and if there is perfect competition on the retail 
side. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not warranted once 
oligopolistic interactions of the retailers are taken into account.  
Perry and Porter (1990) analyze the case where the service provided by 
one retailer has positive spillover effects on the demand faced by each 
retailer. Obviously, this models the free rider argument. They consider free 
entry of retailers and investigate the effect of a two part tariff of the 
manufacturer and RPM on retail prices, on the level of service, on the number 
of retailers, and on social surplus. They employ an isoelastic demand system 
and a model of monopolistic competition rather than oligopolistic competition 
(in order to render their model tractable). Their results show that – given that 
the manufacturer uses a two part tariff – RPM increases the level of service 
and social surplus, if the spillovers are sufficiently strong, and decreases the 
level of service and social surplus in the opposite case.  
Inspired by Mathewson and Winter (1984), Motta (2004) deals with the 
same case (positive spillovers) in an oligopolistic setting. He compares a 
situation where the manufacturer uses a linear whole sale price and a situation 
where he uses a two part tariff and RPM (which induces the vertical 
integration outcome). He finds that social surplus is higher under the vertical 
integration regime. With a fixed number of retail firms service is also higher Resale Price Maintenance  3
 
in this case. Obviously, these results are not consistent with those of Perry 
and Porter. 
As is documented e.g. in Winter (1993) the case of positive spillover 
effects of service is not the most relevant case empirically. Usually retailers 
compete not only by offering low prices but also by providing high quality 
service. This implies that the service provided by one retailer attracts away 
customers from other retailers. The externality is thus negative rather than 
positive. From the point of view of a manufacturer the service of retailers has 
two effects. If all retailers jointly increase their level of service, this enhances 
the demand for the product. This may increase the profit opportunities of the 
manufacturer. But retailers care for their own demand. Their incentive to 
increase service will also be determined by their aim to steal business from 
their competitors. This not necessarily in the interest of the manufacturer. 
Hence, a manufacturer does not have an unambiguous incentive to encourage 
higher levels of service. This argument should not be understood as saying 
that retailers have always an incentive to excessively provide services. Note 
that retailers have two instruments to attract customers, given RPM is not 
practiced: price and service. It may be easier to attract customers by low 
prices which renders service less profitable. From this perspective the level of 
service may be excessively high or low in the eyes of a manufacturer. 
It is known (e.g. R. Winter (1993)) that a manufacturer has the incentive to 
align the interests of retailers and his own by RPM. This instrument may be 
used to increase or to decrease the level of point of sales service together with 
prices in such a context. Winter shows that price and service will increase due 
to RPM, if consumers are more sensitive to price competition than to service 
competition, but that price and service will decrease, if consumers are more 
sensitive to service competition than to price competition (this argument will 
be made more explicit in the main body of the paper). Winter’s paper is the 
only one which allows for service competition (negative spillover) to the best 
of my knowledge. He also provides a specific model of the demand side 
which supports the view that consumers are more sensitive to price 
competition – thus fuelling the predominant view that RPM increases prices 
and the level of service.  
A model of demand which allows for both cases is lacking so far. It seems 
desirable to have such a model, because otherwise price ceilings are left 
unexplained. Note that the practice of recommended prices which is common 
in many markets can be seen as a form of a price ceiling (Chen (1999)). 
Moreover, when the British RPM arrangement in the book trade (the net book 
agreement (NBA)) broke down around 1995, commentators reported that the 
prices for some books increased while prices decreased for other types of 
books (Monopolkommission (2000)). It is therefore one aim of the present Resale Price Maintenance  4
 
paper to provide a simple parsimonious model of the demand side which 
allows for both consequences of RPM to occur.  
The main contribution of the paper, however, is contained in the results on 
the effects of RPM on social surplus in a context, where the service spillover 
is negative which appears to be the empirically prevalent case. To the best of 
my knowledge, no other work has provided any results on these effects 
derived analytically from a rigorous model (rather than by numerical 
examples in Winter (1993) which point at a negative impact of RPM on social 
surplus).  
Although the model of the demand side is linear and therefore quite 
simple, it allows for several partly sobering insights: 1) Whether RPM 
increases or decreases social surplus and whether RPM increases or decreases 
the level of service are entirely different questions. Social surplus may 
increase due to RPM independently of whether the impact on service is 
positive or negative. The same holds true for a decline of social surplus. This 
is bad news to competition authorities. Fuelled by the academic literature on 
positive spillovers of service, they try to find out whether RPM is expected to 
increase service and demand and consider this a necessary condition for RPM 
to have positive efficiency effects. The case of the Swiss book trade 
mentioned above is a case in point. But our results show that an increased 
level of service is neither necessary nor sufficient for an increase of the social 
surplus. This is very different from the results in the literature which stress a 
positive spillover effect of service. 
2) This finding is derived in a model of the demand side which 
corresponds to the “parallel shifting of linear demand curves” case in 
Comanor (1985). This point has some relevance as the Swiss case in the book 
trade suggests that competition authorities use the logic inherent in 
Comanor’s arguments. As pointed out in 1) this leads to questionable 
implications with oligopolistic retailers. The main point here is that our 
results are not derived via an abstrusely modeled demand side but by one 
which is similar to the models of demand existing in the literature on this 
subject. 
3) Despite the simple nature of the demand system the results on the 
impact of RPM on social surplus depend in subtle ways on the parameters of 
the model. Critical values of parameters distinguishing domains leading to a 
positive impact of RPM from those with a negative impact can be determined 
in the present model. But even in this “simple” specification of demand the 
critical levels depend in a nonlinear and not very transparent manner on the 
remaining parameters. This would make it very difficult for a competition 
authority to assess the efficiency impact of RPM. It would need a very precise 
estimate of the parameters of the demand system. It seems save to conclude Resale Price Maintenance  5
 
from this observation that the situation of a competition authority is worse, if 
the demand system is more complex in practice than in our theoretical model. 
4) Obviously these results do not speak for any per se rule (in contrast to 
what we find in reality). But 3) suggests that an argument for a rule of reason 
is weak as well. Based on these findings the best policy option seems to be 
that RPM should not be challenged by competition authorities grounded on 
the service argument alone. While this conclusion could also be drawn from 
the main thrust of the recent (post 1990) literature on the service argument, 
the logic is different. This literature (with the exception of Perry and Porter) 
supports the point that the use of RPM improves efficiency and should 
therefore not be challenged. Even Winter argues in this direction despite his 
numerical example for negative efficiency effects. In the context of the 
present paper it is admitted that RPM may improve or endanger efficiency, 
but there are big doubts concerning the ability of competition authorities to 
tell these cases apart. Of course, this does not say anything about different 
arguments - favorable or unfavorable to RPM. 
The general modeling approach underlying these results follows closely 
Winter (1993). In technical terms the demand system is specified such that an 
analytical treatment of the social surplus becomes possible. In this point the 
model is different from Winter’s. As noted before, this is achieved by 
specifying a linear demand structure. In order to analyze social surplus a link 
between demand and preferences is needed. Going through the examples of 
products which are deemed relevant for RPM (provided e.g. in Winter (1993) 
or Chen (1999)) suggests a discrete choice approach (which is employed by 
these authors well) rather than a representative consumer approach. To that 
end two types of consumers are introduced. 
Consumers of the first type choose the retail outlet which promises the best 
mix of service, price, and other characteristics of the outlet. These are 
modeled similarly to the demand side in Winter (1993). The second type 
consists of consumers who spontaneously decide to visit a store. They do not 
reason where to shop and do not compare retail outlets before a potential 
purchase. They just want to see whether there is something on offer which is 
worth its price. A considerable part of demand in many retail sectors is said to 
be due to this type of consumers. In the model of the present paper their 
presence is responsible for the fact that prices and service may decline due to 
RPM. 
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. Section 1 
provides the model used in this paper together with some supporting 
arguments as to the modeling approach. Section 2 establishes the equilibrium 
result and section 3 establishes results on consumer surplus and welfare. Resale Price Maintenance  6
 
Section 4 concludes, discusses omissions, and relates the results to different 
additional contributions in the literature. 
1. The model 
The general modeling approach follows closely that of R. Winter (1993). One 
monopolistic manufacturer produces goods which are sold by two sellers to 
the consumers. This fits the situation in the book trade quite well. The 
product is a book title and its copyright belongs to exactly one publisher. The 
retail sector of this trade is not particularly concentrated but some (local) 
market power is certainly relevant. Modeling competition as a duopoly 
without much bargaining power vis à vis the manufacturer seems therefore 
adequate. Again this is not only a valid model for the book trade only. 
Whenever manufacturers distribute a branded product via retailers this 
modeling strategy has been the prevalent standard in the relevant literature. 
We follow this strategy although we can easily think of examples where the 
role of the retailer and the manufacturer are reversed or where retailers and 
the manufacturer bargain on approximately equal terms.  
From this it should be clear that interbrand competition is not modeled. We 
add some remarks on this obvious omission in section 4. This section will 
also comment on the relative bargaining strength of retailers and 
manufacturers and on the fact that we abstract from endogenous entry of 
retailers. It should be recalled that the results of the present work have the 
nature of counterexamples to views held up to now. It seems safe to 
hypothesize that the results will be even be more ambiguous, if more aspects 
are taken into account. 
The demand faced by retailer i is modeled as 
j i j i j i j i i dp p d ws s w l a s s p p D + + − − + + = ) 1 ( ) ( ) , , , (
 
where a, l, w, d are non negative parameters and pi denotes the price charged 
by retailer i and si denotes the level of service of retailer i. Note that in this 
specification service provided by the other retailer j induces a negative 
externality on the demand faced by retailer i. Obviously, this is not 
compatible with a positive spillover which is exclusively modeled in the 
literature analyzing the service argument (with the exception of Winter). 
Service should be interpreted in fairly broad terms. It may include well 
organized shelf space, properly trained personnel, pleasant ambience of the 
store etc.  Resale Price Maintenance  7
 
As mentioned in the introduction we employ a discrete choice approach in 
order to link the demand system to preferences of consumers. Hence, each of 
the potential customers purchases one unit of the product or none. 
According to many observers goods like textiles or books are often bought 
by incidence. A consumer strolling through a city may suddenly decide to 
visit a store and to find out what is on offer, although he had no intent to do 
so, when he decided to go downtown. Customers of this type typically do not 
actively search. Once a store is entered he only decides whether or not a good 
that he finds promising is worth its price. But he will not visit another store in 
order to search for a better price (in a world without RPM) or better service. 
To introduce such a type of consumers is not new to the literature. E.g. Chen 
(1999) introduces a similar category (while not considering the quality of 
service) and calls them “local shoppers”. If all consumers were of this type 
there would be no essential role for competition among retailers but for 
showy appearances in order to attract the consumers attention. A retailer 
could more or less act like a local monopolist. In the framework of our model 
this would have the consequence that non linear prices and RPM are perfect 
substitutes for the manufacturer. This will become clear in a moment. 
Certainly, not all consumers are of this type. Some decide to go downtown 
in order to buy e.g. a specific item (e.g. a novel or a textbook). These 
consumers will also decide ex ante where to buy. They may prefer one store 
to another because it is closer in distance or because they prefer certain retail 
brand names to others. But they may also decide on the grounds of 
information about price and service quality at that store. Again, Chen (1999) 
introduces this category of consumers as well (without considering the quality 
of service) and calls them “comparison shoppers”. 
Our model (as the one in Chen) allows for both types of consumers. In 
principle it would be possible to model both types of consumers in a joint 
framework with different search costs. “Local shoppers” who are called 
spontaneous consumers in the present paper could be modeled with 
prohibitively high search costs. However, it is far from clear what the 
advantage from this modeling strategy would be. In addition, the same 
consumer might find himself sometimes in a “spontaneous purchase” 
situation and sometimes in a “comparison shopper” situation. This would be 
obscured by attaching fixed search costs to each consumer. 
This modeling strategy deviates from the demand model in R. Winter 
(1993) which only captures the second type (comparison shopper) of 
consumers. We follow Winter to a large extent in modeling this type of 
consumers which we call choosey consumers. But we simplify his model by 
assuming that these consumers will buy one unit of the good in any case 
which seems adequate in this context. Stores are modeled as being located at Resale Price Maintenance  8
 
the end points of a Hotelling line of length 1. There is a continuum of 
consumers each characterized by his location on the line. As usual the 
location can be interpreted geographically or in terms of product 
differentiation (appearance, internet shop versus mortar and brick store etc.). 
The distribution of consumers with respect to their location is assumed to be 
uniform (another simplification compared with Winter). The mass of these 
consumers is denoted by β.  
The utility of a consumer located at α when patronizing store 1 (which is 
located at 0) is assumed to be 
α b p es B − − + 1 1
 
An analogous expression denotes the utility of this consumer when he 
purchases the good at store 2 (which is located at 1 and therefore α has to be 











− + − +
β β β
 
with an analogous expression for the demand facing store 2. This presupposes 
that B is large enough such that all consumers of this type buy one unit of the 
good.  
The class of spontaneous consumers which end up patronizing retailer i is 
characterized by the utility  
i i p ls A − +
 
when a consumer visits store i. These customers differ in their reservation 
utility  A0 which is distributed uniformly in [ 0, A* ], where A* is large 
enough, such that the demand at store i from spontaneous customers is equal 
to the expression denoting the utility of a customer. Hence demand from both 










p ls A s s p p D − + − + + − + =
β β β
 
The first specification of demand is linked to this one by denoting A + β/2 
by a, eβ/2b by w and β/2b by d.  
As for the cost structure of the firms we assume that the manufacturer has 
constant marginal cost which we normalize to 0 and some fixed cost which 
are sufficiently small to not influence the decision variables of the publisher. Resale Price Maintenance  9
 
Therefore the fixed cost will be neglected in the following. The provision of 
service is costly to the stores. Providing the level of si costs 2 /
2
i cs . 
The pricing behavior of the manufacturer vis à vis the sellers follows again 
Winter (1993). The manufacturer charges store i a price qi per unit of the 
good and a fee Fi independently of the volume of sales. This captures among 
other things the use of rebates which are quite common in the relationship 
between manufacturers and retailers. It also provides the manufacturer with 
an instrument to work against the problem of double marginalization.  
The profit of store i is therefore: 
i i j i j i i i i j i j i i F cs s s p p D q p s s p p − − − = 2 / ) , , , ( ) ( ) , , , (
2 π
 
Without RPM stores choose their level of price and service given qi and Fi . 
With RPM the price is fixed by the manufacturer and the stores can only 
choose their level of service. In slight misuse of notation we denote the 
equilibrium choices as pi (·) and si (·) in both cases. 
The manufacturers profit is 
∑
=
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = Π
2
1
) )) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ( (
i
i j i j i i i F s s p p D q
 
where under RPM pi (·) equals the price which the manufacturer chooses.  
In order to guarantee that all profit functions are concave in their 
respective choice variables we impose the assumption that the cost of service 
provision is high enough. More precisely: 
 
) )( , max( ) 1 ( : ) 1 ( w l w l d c A Assumption + > +  
 
It is immediate that this assumption can be met by sufficiently large values 
of c for any values of d, l, and w. 
As the manufacturer has the possibility of charging non linear prices to 
retailers, it should be clear that he cannot gain anything if only spontaneous 
consumers exit ( β = 0 ). Both retailers are just (local) monopolists in this 
case and RPM and nonlinear prices are perfect substitutes to the 
manufacturer. Resale Price Maintenance  10
 
2. The consequences of RPM for prices and service 
Given the complete symmetry of the stores we will concentrate on symmetric 
equilibrium configurations. Hence prices and service levels are equal for both 
stores. Under RPM prices are of course equal by definition of RPM. 
The demand system as modeled by Winter (1993) yields a clear answer 
with respect to the consequences of RPM for prices and service: It increases 
both prices and service. This is not the case in our model: With RPM the 
price and the service level turns out to be 











The appendix provides a proof of this result as well as proofs for all other 
assertions in this and the following section. Assumption A1 also implies that 
all prices are positive. 
With RPM the parameters reflecting some competition among the stores, w 
and d, play no role. This is to be expected. RPM eliminates any role for price 
competition. Equal prices imply that the manufacturer is exclusively 
interested in aggregate demand which does not depend on w. 
If RPM is not an option for the manufacturer, prices and service turn out to 
be 
) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
)) ( ) ( ) 1 ( (
2
2
w l w w l l d d c
w l w w l dl d c a
pc
+ + + + − +
+ + + − +
=
 
) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
) )( 1 (
2 w l w w l l d d c
w l d a
sc




As is evident from these expression, pRPM and pc do not coincide in general 
and the same is true for sRPM and sc . It is also clear that the publisher’s profit 
will be less in general, if RPM is not available. With RPM he could otherwise 
choose pc as retail price and ask a price qi such that stores would choose sc. 
As the optimal decision under RPM differs from these levels it must be true 
that the profit of the manufacturer is smaller without RPM. 
In terms of comparison we can state the following proposition, which turns 
out to be more transparent, if we return to the notation used in the discrete 
choice description of the demand system:  
 
Proposition 1:   (a) If e < l then pRPM > pc and sRPM > sc .  
        (b) If e > l then pRPM < pc and sRPM < sc .  Resale Price Maintenance  11
 
 
Hence depending on the parameter values prices and service may move in 
different directions if RPM is enabled. Only if e = l nothing changes. Note 
that e > l means that an increase in service increases the utility of choosey 
consumers by more than the utility of spontaneous consumers. An increase in 
service attracts more choosey consumers than spontaneous consumers. 
Without RPM this is more attractive, as stores can set higher prices to cover 
the increased cost of service. 
This result may help to explain why prices of different types of books 
developed in different directions when the NBA broke down. The demand for 
scientific literature could be argued to be quite insensitive to service for those 
customers who visit a book store based on an conscious ex ante decision to 
buy a specific title. Well trained personnel in the content or prominent shelf 
space for this title should play a very minor role for those customers. For 
spontaneous customers a prominent presentation may be a welcome reminder 
that they always wanted to buy this book. Hence e < l captures this situation 
and in line with our result the prices of scientific books are reported to have 
declined after the NBA breakdown. The price of pocket books on the other 
hand increased. At least for novels this is also consistent with our theoretical 
result. Think of the situation that a consumer consciously decides to by a 
novel as a present to a friend and that he only knows that he wants to buy a 
novel of a specific genre. Then well trained personnel becomes important as 
well as the presentation in the store which speaks for a high e. For 
spontaneous customer who browses around without a specific purpose the 
advice of trained personnel is not that important. This speaks for a relatively 
small l. Proposition 1 predicts in this case that prices and service increase 
when RPM is no longer possible. It is not claimed here that these arguments 
explain the movement of prices in Great Britain fully. There are many more 
influences than we capture in this simple model. But the facts seem quite 
consistent with the result. 















where εp denotes the price elasticity and εs denotes the service elasticity of 
demand. The index M relates to the elasticities at the market level while the 
index  r relates to the elasticities at the level of one retailer. One way of 
interpreting this equality is thus: If at the level of one retailer consumers are 
easier attracted by a decrease in price than by an increase in service, than 
competition among stores will drive down prices. As service is worth less it Resale Price Maintenance  12
 
will also decrease. RPM can than be used to stabilize a higher level of 
service. In Winter’s model the demand system satisfies this inequality. 
Given that this characterization for a price increasing effect of RPM is 
quite general (at least locally) it is not surprising that Proposition 1 is fully 
consistent with this inequality. The condition in part (a) can easily be checked 
to be a special case of the above inequality. But – deviating from Winter - our 
demand system is flexible enough to allow for the reversed inequality to hold, 
which is the case in part (b). As we have seen, casual empirical evidence 
supports the view that both directions of prices can be observed after RPM is 
no longer practiced.  
As the level of demand plays an important role in some arguments on the 
efficiency of the service level due to RPM it seems adequate to note the 
following corollary: 
 
Corollary : Market demand increases due to RPM if and only if e ≠ l . 
 
Moreover market demand has the form 2(a + ls – p). Hence it has the 
parallel shifting property mentioned in Comanor (1985). Note also that the 
fact that market demand increases due to RPM (for e ≠ l) does not depend on 
the fact that RPM induces a higher level of service. 
3. The consequences of RPM on consumer surplus and welfare 
If we want compare welfare under RPM with welfare without RPM, this is 
extremely easy for e = l. In this case the same prices and service levels obtain 
whether RPM is an option of the manufacturer or not. Hence, profits, 
consumer surplus of both types of customers, and (therefore) welfare are not 
affected by RPM. For all other parameter constellations a direct comparison 
turns out to be very messy. However, consumer surplus and welfare can be 
taken as functions of the taste parameter e. Using the mathematical properties 
of these functions provides some clear characterizations. 
It is convenient to analyze the surplus of both types of customers first. For 
the type of spontaneous consumers we find that they are always better off 
under RPM, as long as e ≠ l: 
 
Proposition 2: For e ≠ l consumer surplus of spontaneous consumers; CS
sp, 
is always larger with RPM than without RPM.  
 
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that without RPM retailers have more 
freedom to adapt the service levels to the wishes of the choosey consumers. If Resale Price Maintenance  13
 
these consumers derive a higher utility from service ( e > l ), it is possible to 
pass the increased costs on to higher prices (as we have seen in the last 
section). The same holds true if choosey consumers derive less utility. Then 
prices will decrease. Hence, without RPM service and price will be more 
aligned with the wishes of the choosey customers and less so with the wishes 
of the spontaneous customers (relative to the RPM choices). Therefore 
spontaneous customers suffer from the prohibition of RPM. This same 
intuition helps also explain why choosey consumers suffer from RPM: 
 
Proposition 3: For e ≠ l consumer surplus of choosey consumers; CS
ch, is 
always smaller with RPM than without RPM.  
 
While profits are always higher under RPM (for e ≠ l ), consumer surplus 
of both types of consumers are inversely affected by RPM. From what we 
developed so far, we cannot say whether the loss of consumer surplus of one 
type is dominated by gains of the other type of consumers and firms. 
Intuitively one might think that RPM is welfare reducing if the group of 
choosey consumers is large enough ( β ). But this turns out not to be true. The 
number of choosey consumers has an impact on prices and service which is to 
the detriment of the other groups if RPM is not allowed. Hence RPM may 
profit these groups too much to render welfare smaller under RPM. 
Fortunately, it possible to derive a local result at e = l: 
 
Proposition 4: In a neighborhood of e = l welfare is  
(a) higher under RPM (for e ≠ l ), if A is large enough and 
(b) lower under RPM (for e ≠ l ), if b is large enough. 
 
Part (a) of proposition 4 is intuitive given the results obtained so far. A is 
the basic utility of spontaneous consumers. If A  increases demand more 
spontaneous consumers will purchase a unit of the good. Hence, the utility of 
this group will increase if A does. As this group becomes more important and 
as this group profits from RPM, part (a) does not come as surprise. 
Part (b) is bit more subtle. Suppose we are in situation without RPM. Let 
us start with the reaction of price and service to an increase of e, starting from 
e = l. As is clear from proposition 1 price and service will both increase. Now 
b decreases the service and the price elasticity of demand. Hence cet. par. 
retailers have an incentive to charge higher prices and offer lower service, if b 
is increased. As in the double marginalization problem this is not in the 
interest of the manufacturer. Hence he will decrease his wholesale price to 
counteract this effect. In the present model the combined effect is that prices 
and service will increase more due to an increase in e, if b  is larger. Resale Price Maintenance  14
 
Furthermore price and service changes are such that the utility of spontaneous 
consumers is not affected locally. But the choosey customers gain for e > l, as 
they value the increased service higher. As due to an increased b this increase 
in service is higher, choosey costumers gain more. If this gain is sufficiently 
large, welfare increases if RPM is not allowed or phrased otherwise, welfare 
decreases under RPM. 
Note that the result does not depend on whether RPM induces higher or 
lower levels of service. Rather it depends on which group of consumers is 
more affected by RPM.  
4 Concluding remarks 
The paper introduces a specification of the demand side which allows RPM to 
have different effects on prices and on service, which may increase or 
decrease due to RPM.  
A feature of the model which deviates from those found predominantly in 
the literature is that service of one retailer exerts a negative rather than 
positive externality on the other retailer. It is also distinguished from the 
model of Winter (1993) in that it introduces a class of customers who do not 
search but decide on a purchase spontaneously. This is certainly an adequate 
modeling strategy with respect to the book trade. But it is also adequate for 
other product markets, especially those where the price of the commodity 
represents a relatively small fraction of the consumer’s budget.  
While the prices and the service level are influenced by the relative 
importance of those consumers who do search, the qualitative effect of RPM 
on prices and service are not affected, as can be easily checked. 
The findings of the paper support the view that RPM may have an 
efficiency enhancing potential which always sheds doubt on a per se 
prohibition of RPM – especially when other forms of vertical restraints are 
not prohibited per se. But the opposite effect may also arise. RPM may be 
efficiency reducing. Moreover, even in the restricted environment of the 
model, the judgment of whether RPM is detrimental to efficiency or not 
depends on much more delicate tradeoffs as found in the literature. Simple 
indications such as an increased demand due to higher service are found to 
provide neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for RPM to enhance 
efficiency. Indeed, in the context of our model RPM always increases 
aggregate demand, whether service is increased or not. As increased demand 
due to increased service can therefore not serve as an easy indicator for 
improved efficiency via RPM and as critical values for positive rather than 
negative efficiency effects seem hard to handle in practice, our results render Resale Price Maintenance  15
 
a rule of reason objectionable. Neither in the case of positive spillovers (Perry 
and Porter) nor in the case of negative spillovers (present model) challenging 
RPM seems warranted on the merits of the service argument alone. 
The most serious omission of the model concerns the absence of 
competition among manufacturers. Even in the case of the book trade where it 
is true that a publisher usually holds an exclusive copyright on a book title, 
books of similar types are substitutable to a certain extent. It is a frequent 
result in the study of vertical restraints that negative efficiency effects are 
weakened by interbrand competition (cp. Winter (1993) or Motta (2004)). But 
usually these negative effects remain in existence whenever competition is 
not very intense. And thus the warning included in proposition 4 that RPM 
may have negative consequences in terms of efficiency seems justified from 
this perspective.  
Moreover in a recent paper Rey and Vergé (2004) show in a context of two 
manufacturers and two retailers that the manufacturers can use two part tariffs 
plus RPM to reach the collusive outcome. This does not speak for the 
generality of the argument according to which interbrand competition reduces 
the problems which arise with respect to efficiency in an intrabrand context. 
Interestingly enough, they also consider a variant where retailers provide 
service. This variant renders the collusive outcome as the unique equilibrium. 
However, in their set up service provided by one retailer for a specific 
product has no spillover effects to other products and retailers. It would be 
interesting to see what the consequence of spillovers would be in this context. 
But this is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Another shortcoming of our model consists in the assumption of a fixed 
number retailers rather than allowing for free entry of retailers (as in Perry 
and Porter). In a context of entry a manufacturer can use vertical restraints 
such as two part tariffs and RPM to induce the number of retailers which is 
most profitable to him. Depending on the love for variety of consumers this 
may very much deviate from the efficient number of retailers thus inducing 
another concern for efficiency due to RPM. Allowing for such an analysis 
would require a different modeling strategy as it is not straightforward to 
integrate love for variety in the present model. Therefore this issue is also 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
It should be noted that competition is very loosely incorporated in the 
model as the cost of service can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of not 
providing prominent shelf space or informational service for other goods (of a 
rival manufacturer). Given the vast number of retail items, available shelf 
space is certainly scarce and it also impossible for the personnel to be 
properly informed about all items of certain group of products.  Resale Price Maintenance  16
 
There are some contributions to the literature dealing with the scarcity of 
shelf space in the retail sector, most prominently by Shaffer (1991a, 1991b). 
However, both papers give a minor role to retail competition. In Shaffer 
(1991b) a multi-product monopolist tries to convince retailers (which all 
enjoy a local monopoly) to stock their full line of products. It is shown that 
one possibility of reaching the full integration result consists in imposing 
RPM and paying a flat fee for shelf space. Competition is only present, as 
retailers have the option to use their shelf space for presentation of 
commodities of another competitive industry which is not specified more 
precisely. In Shaffer (1991a) manufacturers are perfectly competitive and sell 
to retailers with considerable market power. It remains unclear whether these 
results are robust to oligopolistic interactions.  
The success of new goods, such as books, is usually very uncertain at the 
time of production. The management of the corresponding risk is therefore an 
important part of the strategy of manufacturers and retailers alike. Deneckere 
et al. (1996, 1997) have taken up demand uncertainty and its relationship to 
RPM in two remarkable papers. They show that a monopolistic manufacturer 
has an incentive to impose RPM on its sales to perfectly competitive retailers 
and that this imposition may (but need not) improve welfare and even 
expected consumer surplus. One driving force of the result is that retailers 
have to order inventories before uncertainty unveils and that the costs of these 
inventories are completely sunk. Again while a very interesting result by 
itself it fits many sectors less well, the book trade being one example. The 
uncertainty in those papers deals with the demand of one specific 
homogenous commodity. If a manufacturer produces essentially one product 
this is a suitable modeling strategy. A publisher, however, produces a whole 
line of new books each year. Possibilities to form a less risky portfolio of 
titles are open to a publisher. In addition, it is quite common that publishers 
take back unsold inventories. Hence costs related to inventories are not 
completely sunk. But this drives the results of those papers. Hence, it is not 
clear how the results would change if both aspects would be incorporated, let 
alone the main issue of the present paper: the service argument. 
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Appendix A1: Prices and Service with RPM 
Recall that demand can be written as 
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and that the aim of the manufacturer is 
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The usual argument applies to show that Fi will be set such that retailers 
obtain a reservation profit of 0. This implies 
2 / ) , , , ( ) (
2
i j i j i i i i i cs s s p p D q p F − − =
 
and the profit of the manufacturer becomes: 
∑
=
− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = Π
2
1
2 ) 2 / )) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ( (
i
i j i j i i i cs s s p p D p
 
As prices are equal for both retailers with RPM, this reads in more specific 
terms: 
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Suppose the manufacturer could directly set p and both si. Then maximizing 
the profit would yield the first order conditions: 
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Solving this system gives the expressions for pRPM and sRPM.  
For these expressions to make sense, c has to be large enough which is 
satisfied due to assumption A1. 
In our setup the manufacturer cannot directly set sRPM. It remains to be 
shown that he can implement this level of service by charging a suitable price 
qi to the retailers. In the RPM context the profit of retailer i is: Resale Price Maintenance  20
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Maximizing with respect to si gives the first order condition: 
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In order to obtain the service level sRPM, the manufacturer should therefore set 
qi according to 
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which establishes the result. 
Appendix A.2 Prices and service without RPM 
If retailers choose their price as well as the service level the profit takes the 
form 
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which is concave in the retailers own price and service level, if c is large 
enough. This is satisfied due to assumption A1: 
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The first order conditions can be written as: 
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As announced in the main body of the paper we will concentrate on the 
symmetric solutions. Hence we posit q1 = q2 = q and this implies p1 = p2 = p. 
Then (3) becomes: 
p w l l c d w l l c d q ac )) ( ) 2 (( )) ( ) 1 (( + − + = + − + +
 
which gives  
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Inserting this back into the solution of (2) gives 
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For the same reasons as in appendix A.1 the profit of the manufacturer can 
now be written as 
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Note that the first order conditions for the retailers’ equilibrium have the 
form: 
0 ) ( ) 2 (


























This form will be used in a moment. Consider now the first order condition 





































































































































































































































and using the specific expressions for the demand system gives: 
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Inserting the derivatives of (4) and (5) this condition now reads: 
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Next insert p according to (4). After a series of rearrangements this can be 
rewritten as. 
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Note that under assumption (A1) the second expression in brackets is 
positive. It follows that the profit function of the publisher is concave in q.  
Hence, the publisher will charge each bookseller a price of 
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The remaining steps are conceptually simple: just insert (6) into (4) and 
(5). As doing these steps and getting the result in the main part of the paper is 
not that straightforward we offer some details here. Let us start with the price. 
Inserting (6) into (4) gives 
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The right hand side of the equation above can therefore be written as: 
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Next we focus on the numerator of this expression. Note that 
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Therefore we can write the numerator as follows: 
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From this expression the result for the price in the main body of the paper 
follows immediately. Deriving the result for s poses no problems. 
Appendix A3 Comparison of prices and service levels 
Let us start with a comparison of the service levels: 
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Because of assumption A1 this is equivalent to w < dl.  
The price with RPM is higher than the price without RPM iff 
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Again given assumption A1 this is equivalent to w < dl. Using the definition 
w and d, this establishes proposition 1. 
 
Market demand is in the absence of RPM  c c p ls a − + . Inserting the 
expressions for sc and pc gives: 




w l dl w w l l d d c
d
ac
+ − + + + − +
+
 
Note that sc = sRPM and pc = pRPM for e = l. e enters the demand only via w. As 
sRPM  and pRPM do not depend on w market demand under RPM is constant in 
e. Consider now market demand without RPM as given above. Market 
demand depends on w and thus on e. The monotonicity properties of market 
demand with respect to e are the same as with respect to w. Therefore we will 
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Hence market demand increases iff dl > w or equivalently l > e. This implies 
that market demand as function of e increases up to l and decreases from this 
value onwards. Its maximum is attained at e = l where it reaches its RPM 
level. This proves the Corollary. 
Appendix A4 Consumer and Social surplus effects 
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Hence, given the symmetry of the model total consumer surplus is Resale Price Maintenance  25
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with RPM. Again 
sp
RPM CS does not depend on e. 
sp
c CS  depends on e via prices 
and service levels and attains the same value as 
sp
RPM CS  at e = l. This function 
will rise and fall iff the expression in parentheses rise and fall. In turn this 
expression rises and falls at same conditions as market demand. From this it 
follows that is 
sp
c CS  quasi-concave attaining its maximum at e = l. This 
proves proposition 2. 
Given the symmetric configurations the aggregate gross utility of the 
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ch
c CS  denotes consumer surplus of choosey consumers, if RPM does not 
prevail and 
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RPM CS  if it does. We will look at the properties of 
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We will check the monotonicity properties of this function. Therefore we 
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Given assumption A1 this expression is positive iff e > l. Hence, 
ch
c CS - 
ch
RPM CS  decrease for e < l and increases for e > l. At the minimum at e = l the 
function attains the value of 0. For all other values of e it must therefore 
attain positive values. This proves proposition 3. 
Given the expressions for the aggregate utility for both types of consumers 
social surplus at symmetric solutions is therefore 
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which can be rewritten as 
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As at e = l prices and service levels are same under RPM and without 
RPM, it is obvious that the social surplus is also the same in both situations. 
We denote by Wc resp. WRPM the value of W, if the arguments ( pc, sc ) resp. 
( pRPM, sRPM ) are inserted.  
We consider now an increase in e which induces an increase in w without 
changing any of the remaining parameters. As monotonicity and concavity 
properties are preserved whether e or w are taken as variables, we will use w 
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While this derivative is independent of the value of w, the derivative of Wc 
will in general depend on w. In order to calculate the derivative of Wc at w = 
dl ( e = l ) we need the derivative of s with respect to w at dl: Resale Price Maintenance  27
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The derivative of p with respect to w at dl is : 
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Inserting these values in (7) yields at w = dl  
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From this it follows that  








Therefore we need the second derivative of Wc with respect to w. As WRPM is 
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At w = dl the second derivative of pc and sc with respect to w are: 
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Inserting all of these expressions into (8) gives: 
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The sign of this expression is obviously the sign of the expression in brackets. 
As the last term is negative according to assumption A1, sufficiently large A 
will yield a negative sign. In this case Wc is locally concave. And so is Wc  - 
WRPM. It has a maximum at e = l where it attains the value of 0. This proves 
part (a) of proposition 4. 
Conversely, if b is sufficiently large, then the expression in brackets becomes 
positive. Hence Wc  - WRPM. is locally convex and attains its minimum at e = l 
where it attains the value of 0. This proves part (b) of proposition 4. 
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